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Development and Crisis in Ancient Rome: the Role 
of Mediterranean Trade 
Antonio Luigi Paolilli ∗ 
Abstract: »Entwicklung und Krise im antiken Rom: Die Rolle des mediterra-
nen Handels«. Between the second and the third century A.D., after centuries 
characterized by nearly continuous growth, the Roman Empire experienced a 
profound crisis. Evidence of this crisis comes from important economic sig-
nals, such as the fineness of coins and the number of shipwrecks in the Medi-
terranean Sea. After showing that the empire’s economic decline had already 
begun in the second century A.D., we will outline a hypothesis about the 
causes of the fall, based on the de-specialization of the Roman economic sys-
tem, which prevented it from continuing its evolution towards modernity, lead-
ing it instead along a path of progressive implosion. 
Keywords: Economy of Roman Empire and its decline, fall of Roman Empire. 
 
Between the second and the third century A.D., after centuries characterized by 
nearly continuous growth and after a period in which the ultimate aim of all its 
citizens was the perpetuation of the social and economic conditions in which 
they lived, the Roman Empire experienced a profound crisis. Evidence of this 
crisis comes from important economic signals, such as the fineness of coins 
and the number of shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea (to be interpreted as a 
representative sample of the size of Mediterranean trade). Both these aspects 
point in fact to a real collapse, in concomitance, moreover, with a consistent 
decrease of population, due in our opinion not only to the plague and war 
events, but also to the return of the economic system to less integrated produc-
tion models which were therefore less specialized and productive. 
In the next sections, after showing that the empire’s economic decline had 
already begun in the second century A.D., we will outline a hypothesis about 
the causes of the fall, based on the de-specialization of the Roman economic 
system, which prevented it from continuing its evolution towards modernity, 
leading it instead along a path of progressive implosion. 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Antonio Luigi Paolilli, University of Salento, Via Fran-
cesco Baracca 105, 73024 Maglie (LE), Italy; e-mail: apaolilli@aliceposta.it. 
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Some viewpoints about the development and decline of the 
Roman world 
The economy of the Roman Empire, and particularly the reason for its decline, 
has been at the centre of widespread debate. Not only the creation of the impe-
rial system, but also and above all its decline and fall, have been the subject of 
constant debate. The problem had already been raised by Gibbon (1776) who, 
reading Aristides (1964 [c. 154]), underlined the greatness and opulence of the 
empire in the 2nd century, a greatness that seems to make the later decadence 
inexplicable. 
Rostovcev (1926) and Walbank (1946), who did not consider the Roman 
economy primitive, posed the problem of why it was unable to continue its 
growth to arrive at an industrial take-off, forcing Western Europe to pass, be-
fore reaching this point, through a nearly complete destructuring of its urban, 
economic and cultural system.  
Many theories have been formulated with regard to the problem of the fall 
of the Roman Empire. An author who has written against the prevailing opin-
ion about the progressive economic and social decline is Ward-Perkins (2005). 
The scholar opposes above all the thesis which claims that the Empire under-
went a transformation rather than a decline and a real fall, underlining instead 
that the invasions of the Germanic tribes were for the Romans a traumatic 
event which undermined the economic and social structures of the invaded 
territories. 
The scholar discusses a series of events that contributed to Rome’s fall, such 
as the decline of the Roman military machine, the civil war, and a sequence of 
ineffective emperors. 
Also Heather (2007) reviews a great many reasons which may justify the 
fall of the Roman Empire, preferring, however, a non endogenous – or not 
totally economic – explanation: a pernicious combination of external causes 
(principally the pressure of the Huns, but also the military and political growth 
of the Germanic tribes) and internal causes. Among these emerge usurpations, 
civil war and the defeat of an East-West coalition fleet sent to recapture Car-
thage in 468. 
A more endogenous and deterministic viewpoint is on the other hand that of 
Homer-Dixon (2006), based on the confrontation between economics and 
thermodynamics. For this scholar the success of the empire depended on its 
ability to extract energy surpluses, in the form of food, from the imperial terri-
tories and concentrate them at the centre, where they enabled the development 
of a extraordinary degree of organizational complexity. This complexity would 
not have been possible to establish and maintain without a growing flow of 
energy from outside the system: the reaching of an equilibrium between the 
flow of resources and the size of those necessary to conquer too far distant 
territories was therefore a turning point, from development to recession. Dio-
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cletianus sought the remedy to this recession in draconian fiscal measures, but 
they had the effect of further impoverishing the system. As we can see, in spite 
of the “thermo-dynamical” approach, this theory recalls the definition of 
“predatory” systems, that Cameron (2005 [2003]) proposes for the Roman 
economic system and, more generally, for most of those of the ancient world1. 
It is in fact known that populations of some animal species, if lacking in re-
straints for their reproductive capacities, instead of becoming stable can grow 
too much, exhausting the available resources and then themselves declining. 
Differential equations, like those used in bio-mathematics, have been utilized to 
describe social phenomena, revealing important analogies (Prigogine, 1979, pp. 
54-66). 
A further explanation of the decline of the Roman Empire, and also of why 
its economic and social system did not take the path towards modernity, has 
been put forward by Schiavone (2002 [1996]). He states that the reason the 
Roman economy did not develop towards modernity must be sought in the fact 
that the late republican period, during the transition to the imperial regime, was 
dominated by the slave economy, also because there was no philosophy making 
productive labour worthy of consideration. Schiavone, in fact, underlines that 
the ultimate aim of all the commercial activity in ancient Rome was not the 
reinvestment in the same activity or in others similar to it, but the purchase of 
land in order to enter the landed aristocracy, the sole holder of political power 
and social prestige. Production and commercial activity, moreover, never did 
free itself from the dependence on political power. The Roman hegemonic 
class remained substantially closed, in the sense that whoever entered it em-
braced its ideals and way of living. While on the one hand slave labour can be 
just as efficient as free labour, and Schiavone furnishes historical examples to 
support this thesis (Schiavone, 2002 [1996], pp. 124-127), on the other hand 
slaves do not have the same consumption level as free men2. The abundance of 
slave labour, moreover, tends to keep down the wages of free workers too 
(Cameron, 2005 [2003], p. 69). 
Temin (2001), on the contrary, points out that the Roman economy can be 
defined as a market economy even though the central power played a pre-
eminent role in it. As Hopkins (1980) notes, the State imposed taxes, moving 
wealth toward Rome, Italy and the zones guarded by the legions, and in order 
to pay taxes, the provinces exported goods to them. In this way it implemented 
                                                             
1  About the predatory character of many states of the pre-modern world, see also J. Keay, 
Storia dell’India, Roma, Newton & Compton Editori (2001), pp. 221-232, Italian transla-
tion of India, A History, Harper Collins Publishers (2000). 
2  Naturally this is not always true. Bloch (2001 [1996], p. 225) underlines that in the late 
imperial period the figure of the partially autonomous slave-farmer had begun to spread. On 
the whole, however, we can presume that the demand expressed by a slave-based society, 
though with varying types of slavery conditions, is smaller than in a society in which there 
is practically no slavery. 
 277
a monetary circuit (with a metallic commodity-money) whose first impulse 
originated from political and military power. 
Production for the market, moreover, never involved the whole imperial sys-
tem. Many regions, particularly the internal ones, survived because of produc-
tion for self-consumption. As Temin (2001) writes, “Ships could carry bulky 
goods across the Mediterranean and up rivers, but it was hard and expensive to 
carry them over land. Roman roads were not primarily for the transport of 
goods, and they did not go everywhere […] The result is that inland locations 
were less firmly connected to the general market. To a first approximation, the 
Roman market for bulk commodities extended only slightly beyond where 
ships could go, although high-value goods could travel to land-locked destina-
tions”. 
Production for the market, though impressive in its entirety, never achieved 
its maximum potential value, and not only for the reasons just given. Once 
opulence had been achieved for the few, who long only for the perpetuation of 
their privileges, there was almost no middle class pushing toward continuous 
development, capable of starting a real commercial revolution, as instead was 
to happen in the Late Middle Ages. 
Mediterranean trade and monetization of the economy in 
ancient Rome 
A great deal has been written about the degree of monetization of the Roman 
economy. Duncan-Jones (1994) has estimated, for the middle of the second 
century A.D., a stock of money of approximately twenty billion sestertii. If 
exact, the estimate might be indicative of a considerable degree of monetiza-
tion, an idea confirmed, moreover, by the research into the composition of ice 
layers in Greenland and into lake basin sediments in Sweden, Switzerland and 
Spain (Hong, Candelone, Patterson, Boutron, 1994, 1996; Hong, Candelone, 
Soutif, Boutron, 1996; Renberg, Persson, Enteryd, 1994; Shotyk, Weiss, Ap-
pleby, Cheburkin, Frei, Gloor, Kramers, Reese, Van Der Knaap, 1998). 
This research has shown that atmospheric pollution appeared in the northern 
hemisphere in the Roman age, due to silver, copper and lead mining, at a level 
not reached again until to the industrial revolution 3. 
On the other hand, as revealed by Duncan-Jones (1994, pp. 172-179), mone-
tary circulation seems to have been local rather than Mediterranean, and this 
appears true above all for the centuries after the second century A.D. Lo Cascio 
(2003) provides an explanation of this phenomenon, suggesting above all that 
                                                             
3  See E. Lo Cascio, “Il denarius e gli scambi intermediterranei”, Moneta Mercanti Banchieri. 
I precedenti greci e romani dell’Euro. Atti del convegno internazionale, Cividale del Friuli, 
26-28 settembre 2002, Pisa, Fondazione Niccolò Canussio (2003), pp. 147-165. 
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the transfer of money from the provinces to Rome and vice-versa, respectively 
for taxation and payment of troops, happened only for the settlements and that 
this, therefore, does not imply a scarcity of Mediterranean trading. The inten-
sity of this trade, however, is witnessed by the number of shipwrecks occurring 
in the period 200 B.C. – 200 A.D., far more numerous than those of the preced-
ing and following periods (Parker, 1992). On the other hand, evidence of the 
localization of monetary circulation seems to exist just for the centuries follow-
ing the end of the adoptive emperors’ dynasty. 
In examining the data presented by Parker (1992), related to the shipwrecks 
occurring in the Mediterranean Sea in ancient times, Hopkins (1980) notes in 
fact that they reached their greatest intensity in the last two centuries B.C. and 
in the first two A.D. and that, however, in the latter period they were a little 
less numerous than those of the previous two centuries. As is shown in figure 1, 
the shipwrecks seem to follow the profile of a normal curve, with its peak near 
the beginning of the Christian age, and this fact therefore seems to denote a 
reduction in sea traffic which had been slowly going on since the early years of 
the Empire. Hopkins, however, does not deduce that trading across the Medi-
terranean was more intense in the two centuries before the birth of Christ than 
in imperial times, attributing the greater number of shipwrecks in the former 
period to the piracy, which was interrupted under Pompeus. However we must 
admit that aggregating the data for centuries, as has been done by Parker (1992, 
pp. 549-550; see figure 1), or by Hopkins (1980) for periods of two hundred 
years, does not highlight this explanation.  
If instead we construct a histogram using the same data furnished by Parker, 
but with an aggregation for periods of fifty years, we obtain a more interesting 
result (see figure 2). 
This enables us to see that in accordance with the presumable growth of 
trading, the shipwrecks seem to follow an exponential trend which finishes at 
the end of the first half of the second century A.D.. From this trend there was a 
noticeable divergence, again exponential, only during the period between the 
battle of Zama (201 B.C.) and the campaign of Pompeus against the pirates (67 
B. C.), a period that, as we know and as is also underlined by Hopkins, was 
characterized by increasing piracy. 
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Figure 1: Shipwrecks for periods of centuries 
 
The histogram shows the number of shipwrecks in the centuries V B.C. – V A.D., ac-
cording to the data furnished by Parker (cited, 1992), collected for periods of one hun-
dred years. 
 
Figure 2: Shipwrecks for periods of fifty years 
 
The histogram shows the number of shipwrecks in the centuries V B.C. – V A.D., ac-
cording to the data furnished by Parker (cited, 1992), collected for periods of fifty years. 
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If we interpolate the data relative to the period 500 B.C. – 150 A.D., but 
with the exclusion of those of the three periods of fifty years characterized by 
strong pirate activity, we obtain an exponential curve quite near to the actual 
data (figure 3)4, and this fact could induce us to think that the growth of traffic 
preceded the Roman expansion or, at least, favoured it. Roman expansion and 
growth of trading in the Mediterranean sea, however, are closely interrelated, 
and it is difficult to say with certainty which of the two phenomena must be 
regarded as the independent variable: probably it was a co-evolutionary phe-
nomenon: the navigability of the Mediterranean favoured the forming of a 
single state along its coasts, but the latter greatly favoured the expansion of 
maritime traffic. 
Figure 3: Actual shipwrecks up to 150 A. D. and their interpolation 
 
In the graph the actual shipwrecks are compared with the exponential curve of interpola-
tion; the shipwrecks of the piracy period (periods 7, 8 and 9), are not considered in the 
regression. 
Decline of the imperial economic model 
According to Hopkins’ model (1980) cited above, the state, by means of taxa-
tion, drew money towards Rome, Italy and the frontier areas in which defensive 
                                                             
4  For the interpolation we have utilized the exponential function y=20.921 + 1.433 x, where 
the time x is expressed in periods of fifty years (than varying from 1, for the first period, to 
13); y is the number of shipwrecks for each period. 
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armies were stationed; to pay taxes the provinces exported their goods5. This 
then started a monetary circuit initially triggered by the political and military 
power6. This model has been reviewed by Hopkins himself (1995/96, 2000); 
however Lo Cascio (2003), who also notes that public finance actually did not 
place a great burden on the economy of the Empire, admits and underlines that 
it had a role of flywheel in forming the middle and long period trends in the 
imperial economy taken as a whole. In the author’s view, this was due to its 
structural character, given the slowness of re-equilibration mechanisms (above 
all the difficulties of transport), and to the crucial role that the single monetary 
system played, jointly with the other imperial institutions, in reducing transac-
tion costs (the author refers, particularly, to North’s theory: North, 1990). 
From the second half of the 2nd century A.D. the trend, however, changed 
direction, proceeding faster too: at the same time the empire, as the single 
institution unifying the Mediterranean, collapsed. It tried to resist by means of a 
series of military campaigns, begun under Marcus Aurelius, and then began to 
divide. The commercial importance of the Mediterranean progressively dimin-
ished because the economic structures of the territories changed. Precisely 
because of the dynamics of the imperial economic system, Italy in particular, 
which enjoyed a flow of money from the provinces, experienced centuries of 
higher prices compared to the provinces, with a progressive damage for its 
internal production, wrong-footed by the competition from the provinces (Lo 
Cascio, 2003). 
While the outlying areas, particularly the Orient, firstly with Odenatus and 
later with queen Zenobia, and the West with the Imperium Galliarum, tended to 
become self-sufficient also from a military viewpoint, Italy lost its central role 
in the imperial economy and along with the Balkan peninsula was pillaged by 
Germanic populations. Aurelanius wanted to reunite the empire, but Dio-
cletianus would politically sanction what was to become an economic and 
social reality. The reduced importance of the central part of the empire is also 
shown by the fact that, while it is true that the sea traffic was declining, this did 
not correspond everywhere to a reduced importance of the monetary economy. 
With regard to the Imperium Galliarum, for example, although the traditional 
theory is that the Gallic provinces broke with Rome because they were frus-
trated by its inability to protect them from invasions, some scholars assert that 
these provinces had reached an economic autonomy and a prosperity that al-
lowed them to obtain political and military independence from Rome (Drink-
water, 1987). 
                                                             
5  Hopkins (1980) noted that only a small part of taxes was in nature, for free distribution. 
6  Hopkins (1980) pointed out that there is a correlation, in the period of second century B.C., 
between military expenditure and monetary emissions, which however does not necessarily 
imply a causal relation between the two variables, since they could be linked to a third. 
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Moreover the progressive achievement of the provinces, also from a politi-
cal viewpoint, was already shown long before the crisis by the origin of the 
emperors. 
The decline of maritime traffic, however, was not without effects on the 
economy. The recourse to navigation, in fact, can influence the productivity of 
the system in two ways. The effect first felt is the reduction of transport costs, 
making less necessary expensive and difficult haulage (and often enabling 
otherwise impossible transfers). Transport, moreover, affects a very important 
“factor”: the geographic division of labour. 
In a recent paper (Paolilli, 2005 a), by means of a mathematical model, it 
was shown that maritime traffic, just by means of the geographic division of 
labour, can greatly influence the size of the potential production (and therefore 
of the potential population) of a territory. In effect, by examining figure 2, we 
can see that from the second half of the second century A.D., shipwrecks and 
presumably the traffic they were involved in had already diminished, and this 
coincides with the demographic decline of the empire (although the more direct 
cause of this decline seems to be the plague). In another work (Paolilli, 2005 
b), by means of a similar model, this time applied to the degree of monetization 
of the economy and therefore in correlation with the monetary exchanges as a 
whole and not only with maritime trade, it is shown that reductions in popula-
tion, even though caused by plagues, cannot be recuperated if the economy’s 
degree of monetization diminishes, pushing the system to a lower level of 
specialization (and therefore also of productivity). The footnotes give the for-
mula for the calculation of the production of a socio-economic system, ob-
tained from the abovementioned model, and a brief discussion of it7. 
In the case that we have examined, even without certain data about the re-
duced degree of monetization of the Roman economy, we can however hy-
pothesize a considerable de-specialization of the production activity, indicated 
by the fall in maritime traffic. Moreover, the considerable reduction in coin 
                                                             
7  The function for the calculation of the potentialities of the system, expressed in terms of 
potential population, is: ( ) αγα γαμ r1Ν=Υ . It is obtained from the following production 
function (a Cobb-Douglas type function), applied to a macro-system: Κ−ΚΡΝ=Υ rγβαμ , 
considering K as a variable to optimize (in the paper cited the production Y coincides with 
the potential population P, since it is assumed that the unitary production is what is neces-
sary for the survival of an average individual, and it is furthermore supposed β = 0). N is 
the “nature” factor, or the soil (expressed in number of individuals who can survive in a 
given area, without technical intervention) and it is a given, K is the capital (technical 
means) invested in the various economic activities, r is the coefficient of capital restoration 
cost, α and γ are the exponents (with α + γ = 1) respectively of N and K , which quantify the 
productivity of these factors, and μ is a measure of the system’s degree of monetization. It 
depends – according with a relation which for the sake of simplicity we omit – on the 
amount of production entering the monetized commercial circuit, assuming a unitary value 
in the absence of money, greater than 1 in the opposite case. 
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fineness, above all of the denarius, and the consequent inflation, along with 
some evidence of a return to bartering, point to a crisis of the monetary econ-
omy. 
But why did Mediterranean trade start to decrease? We have mentioned the 
comparison made by Cameron between the Roman system and a predatory 
mechanism, as well as the explanation, borrowed from thermo-dynamics, of its 
decline. As we have outlined, a predatory system can work without crisis only 
if the resources grow in proportion to the population using them. In the Roman 
world, from the age of Marcus Aurelius onwards, this clearly did not happen. 
The productive economy, in many respects, appeared stagnant while, on the 
contrary, the military costs grew. As explained by Lo Cascio (2003), conquest 
was really a precondition for the increase of monetisation of the economy, an 
economy that, as Schiavone writes (2002 [1996], pp. 114-115), was not able to 
stand on its own feet, being strongly dependent on the political system. In the 
age of adoptive emperors the empire had already ceased to expand (Adrianus 
had already decided to abandon some of Traianus’ conquests), but instead of 
decreasing, the military costs grew further. After that dynasty the army’s role in 
the system of power transmission also grew. 
When examining the histogram in figure 2 one may suspect that it was pre-
cisely the increasing speed of the system that determined its implosion, which 
could perhaps have been avoided only by means of a radical change in the 
empire’s economic and cultural structure. The system did in fact change, but 
only to assume lower production levels, with less and less trade and, by follow-
ing productive models like that of villae, in certain respects anticipated the 
feudal fragmentation, therefore missing the chance to continue its evolution 
towards modernity. 
The models presented in the papers cited are very sensitive to the costs of 
capital restoration. This, moreover, is in accordance with the increase in ship-
wrecks in the piracy period which, as we know, caused many difficulties even 
to the rampant Roman economy of the period, threatening the very survival of 
the plebeians, which depended on wheat shipped by sea routes. 
Coming back to the historical period we are examining, which began with 
Marcus Aurelius, we can hypothesize an increase of the capital restoration cost 
(r in the model presented in footnote 7) due to the devastation caused by the 
increased military activities in the empire’s territories. The graph in figure 4 
shows that the potential production Y of an economic system is sensitive even 
to slight (but lasting) variations in this cost8. Figure 5, on the other hand, shows 
                                                             
8  The parameter values are approximately those presented in Paolilli (2005 b). Only N and μ 
are quite different: N is 150,000, referring to the Italian territory (see Paolilli, 2005 a), and 
μ in this work is greater than that used in Paolilli (2005 b) for England of the Roman age., 
due to the fact that at that time the latter, being a peripheral territory, was presumably less 
monetised than Italy. Assigning this greater value to μ and assuming, as in Paolilli (2005 b), 
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how Y varies depending on the value of capital productivity (Y , which in the 
model depends directly on the technological level. This level, as it is shown in 
the works cited, is not totally independent on the degree of monetization: 
scarcely monetized economic systems are presumably not compatible with high 
technological standards. We can therefore expect that if an economic system 
returns to self-consumption production, the production level, due to the reduc-
tion of synergies between the degree of monetisation and the technological 
level, may collapse (we must also add that even the reduction of the degree of 
monetization alone, as is shown by the formula in footnote 7, induces or at least 
highlights a reduction in the potential production). 
The essential point is that the end of the second century saw the breakdown 
of a mechanism that had assured, but also imposed, an exponential economic 
growth. The Roman economy was indissolubly linked to politics. When the 
population began to decline, due to plagues, devastation from the invasions, but 
also and above all due to the plummeting confidence in money, the economic 
system retreated to less specialized production modes, therefore becoming less 
productive. The burden of the state machine however remained the same, or 
even grew, and this further suffocated economic activities, rendering the single 
empire simply obsolete: the economic unity of the Mediterranean had failed. 
In a world in which money, above all if was gold or silver money, was real 
wealth, its continued drain to the East was in fact a problem capable of causing 
negative repercussions of no small significance. This problem was not new9 
but, with the cessation of the conquests and the consequent “revenues”, its 
burden gradually became unsustainable, also and above all because it was 
worsened by the growing demands of the army, which was more and more 
necessary and more and more a power broker. The army was more expensive 
but yielded less. 
The Roman production circuit jammed, lacking the precious metal which 
would continue to start it up, given the monetary system based principally on 
metal coinage10. The system returned to barter and to an economy that more 
and more prefigured the feudal one, with the inevitable de-specialization of 
economic activities and the consequent reduction in global production. 
                                                                                                                                
r = 0.1, we obtain a potential population, for Italy, of about ten million inhabitants, a value 
not far from the presumable actual population of that time (Reinhard, Armengaud, 
Dupaquier, 1971, pp. 66-69). We also assume, as in the paper cited (Paolilli, 2005 b), 
α + γ = 1. 
9  Plinius Senior had already complained about the enormous sums dissipated to buy oriental 
products. 
10  We say “principally”, and not “completely”, because, as shown by Lo Cascio (2003), loans 
were present in the Roman world, also without paper instruments like those used in the Late 
Middle Ages. 
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Figure 4: Relation between the coefficient r and the potential production Y 
 
The graph shows the relation between the capital restoration coefficient r and the poten-
tial production Y. 
 
Figure 5: Relation between the value of g and the potential production Y 
 
The graph shows the relation between γ and the potential production Y. 
 
Until it achieved complete domination of the Mediterranean sea and of the 
territories around it, also the love of luxury (in addition, more generally, to that 
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of power) stimulated the growth of the Roman economy, which found in mili-
tary conquests the “fuel” for its maintenance and expansion11. 
Once this domination was achieved, however, the fact that there was no 
place for a middle class capable of bringing a new vigour and new ideals turned 
the luxury consumption of the upper class from the driving force of growth, 
albeit based on military dynamics, into a burden for the system, already bearing 
the more and more burdensome task of maintaining the army and the proletariat 
of Rome and other principal cities of the empire. To push the system back 
definitively and to bring an irremediable break-up to its great integration, all it 
took was a serious demographic crisis. 
Conclusions 
The Roman Empire, like many states in the ancient world, was, at least par-
tially, a system of the predatory type, with an economy widely based on slave 
work relations. However, unlike some of these states, which grew to be sud-
denly replaced by other political subjects without radically changing the life of 
the subject peoples (apart from the consequences of specific military events), 
the Roman Empire represents for the territories around the Mediterranean, 
above all of the western basin, a great influence on development, beyond or 
maybe due precisely to that co-evolutionary phenomenon mentioned above. 
This is testified by the number of shipwrecks, the quantity of money put in 
circulation, and also their decline. 
The reason for this moulding force may lie in the very voracity of the Ro-
man state, which induced such an increment of trade that it profoundly trans-
formed the economic structure and the weltanschauung of the European and 
Mediterranean communities, and this happened in spite of the seemingly scarce 
effect of taxation on imperial production. During the state’s phase of expan-
sion, whole communities were deported, others were constituted or re-founded, 
and many were reached by new roads. The Roman state was not, in other 
words, given the prevailing agricultural structures of the economy of that time, 
with their scarce surpluses, an absentee state, confining itself to merely per-
ceiving this surplus, but it was a state which re-founded and transformed that 
structure, greatly increasing the yields, albeit only for a few centuries. When 
                                                             
11  With regard to the role of the fondness for luxury and, more generally, for power, in the 
origin and expansion of the ancient empires, it could be illuminating the look at analogy 
with the evolution of species, as it is seen by Jantsch (1980). According to the scholar, “if 
the drive of evolution were simply adaptation, then evolutionary change should have ceased 
with the bacteria” because they are able “to mutate and adapt to all kinds of adverse condi-
tions with amazing speed”, while instead it seems that what men and, more generally, living 
creatures pursue is not only mere survival, but also and perhaps above all the “pure ‘intensi-
fication of life’” (the phrases in inverted commas are from Briggs and Peat (1989, p. 155). 
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the push ceased, in our opinion due to the above-mentioned causes, the eco-
nomic system collapsed, making the empire more vulnerable also from a politi-
cal viewpoint, but the world which emerged was not the same. Some structures 
survived. The means of communication, for example, and not only the actual 
roads, but also the cultural ones, like Latin, the law, the religion, would serve in 
the future to put men of different lands back into communication on their way 
towards a new development. 
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